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HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH
AND SCHOOL v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION—AN AFFIRMATION OF THE
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION

by

J.L.Yranski Nasuti, MDiv, JD, LLM*
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 federal
discrimination statutes have had a significant impact on
employment law in the United States. Employment decisions
may no longer be based on a person’s membership in a
protected class and employers may not retaliate against
employees who seek to enforce their statutory rights. That is
unless the employee works for a religious organization and
falls within the “ministerial exception.” In the case of
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter
Hosanna-Tabor),2 the U.S. Supreme Court has held, as a
matter of first impression, that employees who are deemed to
be “ministers” are precluded from claiming protection under
employment discrimination statutes when their employers are
religious institutions.
I.
The Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
(hereinafter Hosanna-Tabor), which is located in Redford,
Michigan, is a member of the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran
__________________
*Professor of Legal Studies in Business
Iona College, New Rochelle, New York
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Church. As part of its mission Hosanna-Tabor operates a small
elementary school that offers a “Christ-centered education”
that helps parents by “reinforcing biblical principals [sic]
standards.”3 As is the case for all schools within the Missouri
Synod, Hosanna-Tabor employs two types of teachers—those
who are “called” and those who are “lay.” A called teacher is
one who has been chosen to his or her vocation by God through
a particular congregation. In order to receive a call, a teacher
typically completes a “colloquy” program at a Lutheran college
or university. It is only after a teacher has taken eight
theological courses, been endorsed by his or her local Synod
district, and passed an oral exam administered by a faculty
committee that the teacher may be called by a congregation.
Once called a teacher is given the formal title of “Minister of
Religion, Commissioned” and serves an open-ended term. A
called teacher may also receive a special income tax housing
allowance so long as the teacher is conducting activities “in the
exercise of ministry.”4 If a person is hired to be a lay or
contract teacher, he or she does not have to be trained by the
Synod nor even be a member of the Lutheran Church. A lay
teacher is appointed by the school board (without a vote by the
congregation) and receives a one-year renewable contract.5 In
the hiring process, preference is given to called teachers. This
is true despite the fact that called and lay teachers generally
perform the same services.
In 1999, Hosanna-Tabor hired Cheryl Perich to teach
kindergarten as a lay teacher. At that time, Perich was already
attending colloquy classes at Concordia College. Upon
completing her course work in February 2000, she was called
by the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and was,
thereafter, listed as a commissioned minister in the Lutheran
Church—Missouri Synod. Perich’s responsibilities as a called
teacher were the same as those that she had as a lay teacher.6
She taught math, language arts, social studies, science, gym,
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art, and music. Four days a week she conducted a thirty minute
religion class and one day a week she attended a chapel service
with her students. She also led her class in prayer three times a
day and, in her final year, joined her class in a devotional
service for five to ten minutes each morning. Approximately
twice a year, Perich, in rotation with other teachers (called and
lay), led the chapel service. Over the course of a seven-hour
school day, Perich spent approximately forty-five minutes in
activities related to religion.7
Perich became ill while attending a Hosanna-Tabor golf
outing in June 2004. As her doctors struggled to diagnose her
condition, Perich and the school administrators agreed that it
would be best for her to go on disability leave for the 20042005 academic year.8 In December, Perich notified the
school’s principal, Stacy Hoeft, that she had been diagnosed
with narcolepsy and would be able to resume her teaching
duties in two to four months (depending on how long it took to
stabilize her condition with medication). During the next
month the school informed Perich that it had decided to hire a
substitute teacher to take over her responsibilities. (Up until
that point, another teacher at Hosanna-Tabor had assumed
responsibility for three grade levels in order to cover for
Perich.) The school also asked Perich to begin discussing with
her doctor what she would have to do in order to return to the
classroom the following fall. Perich subsequently informed the
school that when she returned, she would be fully functional
through the use of medication. Two days later, Hoeft notified
Perich by e-mail of a proposed amendment to the employee
handbook that would request employees who had been on
disability for more than six months to resign their calls so that
the school could responsibly fill their positions.9 Employees
who resigned because of disabilities would, however, not be
precluded from seeking reinstatement of their calls if they
health was restored. At that time Perich was told of the
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proposed amendment, she had been on disability leave for over
five months.
Perich immediately called Hoeft to her tell that she would
be returning to work within the month. Hoeft became worried
that Perich’s early return would not be in the best interest of the
students—especially since Perich had informed the school only
a few days earlier of her continued inability to function fully.
Three days later, at a meeting of the Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Church, the school administration expressed
concerns that Perich would not be able to return to teaching
either that year or the next. Based on those representations, the
congregation voted in favor of a resolution asking Perich to
agree to a peaceful release agreement.10 Under the terms of the
agreement, Perich would resign her call and the congregation
would pay for a portion of her health insurance for the
remainder of the calendar year.
Perich rejected the
congregation’s offer and submitted a note from her doctor
indicating that she would be able to return to work within a few
weeks. Her refusal to submit a letter of resignation continued
even after the school board urged her to reconsider her decision
and informed her that it no longer had a position for her.
When Perich returned to the school on the morning of the
first day she was medically cleared to work, she was
immediately told by Hoeft to leave. That afternoon, Hoeft
called Perich to tell her that it was likely that she was going to
be fired. Perich responded by informing Hoeft that she had
consulted with an attorney and was prepared to take legal
action. The school board met that same night and subsequently
informed Perich that it was reviewing the process for
rescinding her call in light of her “regrettable” actions.11 A
case for termination was then presented to and accepted by the
congregation. The two main grounds given for removing
Perich’s call were her “insubordination and disruptive
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behavior” on the day she attempted to return to work and the
damage “beyond repair” that she had done to her “working
relationship” with the school by “threatening to take legal
action.”12
Perich filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (hereinafter EEOC) based on a
wrongful termination claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (hereinafter ADA).13 The ADA not only
prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified
employee based on a disability, but it also prohibits an
employee from retaliating “against any individual because such
individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by
[the ADA] or because such individual made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA].”14 The EEOC filed a
lawsuit against Hosanna-Tabor in the U.S. District Court based
on the claim that Perich had been fired in retaliation for
threatening to sue under the ADA. Perich intervened in the
case alleging similar claims of unlawful retaliation under the
ADA and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights
Act.15
Hosanna-Tabor filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting a “ministerial exception” that precludes government
interference with “quintessentially” religious matters. The
Church argued that the First Amendment barred lawsuits when
they involved employment relationships between religious
organizations and their ministerial employees. It went on to
claim that Perich was a ministerial employee and that the
reason she was fired was based on the Synod’s religious belief
that Christians should resolve their disputes internally. The
U.S. District Court granted Hosanna-Tabor’s motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the church had treated
Perich as one of its ministers long before the litigation began.16
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On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
vacated the lower court decision and remanded the case
instructing the trial court to consider the merits of the
retaliation claims. Although the Circuit Court acknowledged
that a ministerial exception would bar certain employment
discrimination claims, it concluded that Perich’s claim could
proceed since she was not in fact a “minister.”17
II.
A. Majority Opinion
When the U.S. Supreme Court justices heard oral arguments
in the Hosanna-Tabor case, it was clear that many of the
justices were trying to find a way to balance the government’s
concern for the victims of employment discrimination with the
religious organization’s concern that that same government not
meddle in its internal affairs.18 Three months later those
concerns were addressed by Chief Justice John Roberts in a
unanimous opinion in favor of the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Church and School. In the concluding paragraph of his
opinion, Robert wrote that “the interest of society in the
enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is
undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious
groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their
faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has
been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was
discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for
us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it
on its way.”19 In such a case, the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar employment
discrimination suits by ministers against their churches.
Roberts began his analysis of the First Amendment religion
clauses by recalling significant moments in Anglo-American
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history where there had been controversies between church and
state over appointments to religious offices.20 He postulated
that it was because of these kinds of controversies that “the
founding generation sought to foreclose the possibility of a
national church.”21 This was accomplished through the
inclusion of the Religion Clauses in the First Amendment of
the Bill of Rights. The Establishment Clause precluded the
government from being involved in the appointment of
ministers and the Free Exercise Clause similarly prevented the
government from interfering with a religious group’s right to
select its own ministers.22
In his attempt to review prior Supreme Court decisions
involving the Religion Clauses, Roberts was not surprised to
find so few cases involving issues relating to the interference
by the government in the ministerial selection process. He
credited this phenomenon to a general understanding of the
Religion Clauses—as well as to the absence of employment
regulatory laws prior to the 1960s.23 He did, however, find
support for his belief “that it is impermissible for the
government to contradict a church’s determination of who can
act as its ministers”24 in a number of cases involving disputes
over church property.
In the nineteenth century case of Watson v. Jones
(hereinafter Watson),25 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to
question a decision by the Presbyterian Church involving
church property that was located in Louisville, Kentucky. The
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church had awarded the
property to an antislavery faction over the objections of a
proslavery faction. The Court based its decision on the
grounds that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith,
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the
highest of church judicatories to which the matter has been
carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final,
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and as binding on them.”26
Eighty years later, in the case of Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America
(hereinafter Kedroff),27 the Supreme Court was asked to decide
who had the right to use a particular Russian Orthodox
cathedral in New York City. Following the Bolshevist
Revolution in 1917, many of the Russian Orthodox churches in
North America split from the Supreme Church Authority of the
Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow (which was thought to
have become a tool of the Soviet government.) The separation
from the mother church in Russia included the establishment of
an autonomous administration for the North American Russian
Orthodox Church. The Russian Orthodox churches in North
America consequently argued that the right to use the cathedral
in New York belonged to an archbishop elected by them. The
Supreme Church Authority in Russia, on the other hand,
claimed that that right belonged to an archbishop appointed by
the patriarch in Moscow. Under New York statutory law
(known as Article 5-C), Russian Orthodox churches in New
York were required to recognize the authority of the governing
body of the North American churches. 28 The U.S. Supreme
Court, ruling in favor of the Supreme Church Authority in
Russia, found the state law to be unconstitutional on the
grounds that it “directly prohibit[ed] the free exercise of an
ecclesiastical right, the Church’s choice of hierarchy.”29
The right of a church to select its own hierarchy was
reaffirmed in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United
States and Canada v. Milivojevich (hereinafter Milivojevich),30
another case involving the issue of who should have control
over a diocese, including it property and assets. Dionisije
Milivojevich had been removed as the bishop of the AmericanCanadian Diocese after a dispute with church hierarchy. He
sued the church in an Illinois state court claiming that the
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proceedings leading to his removal violated the church’s laws
and regulations. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state
court’s decision in favor of Milivojevich on the grounds that
hierarchical religious organizations have a First Amendment
right “to establish their own rules and regulations for internal
discipline and government, and to create tribunals for
adjudicating disputes over these matters.”31 Consequently the
decisions of those tribunals had to be recognized as binding by
civil courts. It was therefore unconstitutional for a court to
undertake “the resolution of quintessentially religious
controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits
exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals.”32
Roberts then turned to the primary issue that differentiated
Hosanna-Tabor from Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojezich-whether a religious organization’s freedom to select its own
ministers could be restricted by employment discrimination
statutes. Although this was a matter of first impression for the
Supreme Court, it was one that had been addressed by the
Courts of Appeals for many years.33 Their uniform approach
had been to recognize the existence of a “ministerial
exception” that was based on the First Amendment and that
precluded ministers from bringing claims against religious
institutions based on anti-discrimination employment
legislation. The Supreme Court agreed with the Circuit Courts
that such an exception was necessary since it ensured that the
members of a particular religious group, and not the
government, could best decide which ministers “will personify
its beliefs.”34 That was why it would be a violation of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment for the government
to invoke Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to compel the
Catholic Church or an Orthodox Jewish Seminary to ordain
women.35
A more difficult issue for the Court to decide was that of
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who was covered by the ministerial exception. Roberts noted
that every Circuit Court that had considered the scope of the
exception had concluded that it was not limited the heads of
religious congregations—the priests, the ministers, and the
rabbis. While he agreed with that conclusion, he declined to
provide any “rigid formula” for deciding when an employee
qualifies as a minister. He stated instead that “it was enough
for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the
ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given
all the circumstances of her employment.”36
Roberts went on to highlight a number of factors that
contributed to the Court’s conclusion that Perich was in fact
covered by the ministerial exception. Many of those factors
had to do with her call and commissioning. Hosanna-Tabor
held her out to be a called minister with a role distinct from
other members of the congregation.37 She was accorded the
title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”38 When she
received her call, she was tasked to perform her office
“according to the Word of God and the confessional standards
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church as drawn from the Sacred
Scriptures.”39 At her commissioning, the congregation prayed
that God “bless [her] ministrations to the glory of His holy
name, [and] the building of His church.”40 The congregation
also periodically reviewed her “skills of ministry” and
“ministerial responsibilities” and provided her with “continuing
education as a professional person in the ministry of the
Gospel.”41 Prior to receiving her call, she had spent six years
completing eight college-level theology courses in subjects
including biblical interpretation, church doctrine, and the
ministry of the Lutheran teacher in order to obtain the
endorsement of her local Synod district. She subsequently
passed an oral exam by a faculty committee at the Lutheran
college and she was commissioned by the Hosanna-Tabor
congregation.42
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Perich actions also indicated that she considered herself to
be a minister. She accepted the call.43 She claimed a special
housing allowance on her taxes that was only available to those
earning compensation “in the exercise of the ministry.”44 In a
letter that she sent to the Synod following her termination, she
affirmatively stated that “I feel that God is leading me to serve
the teaching ministry . . . I am anxious to be in the teaching
ministry again soon.”45
The Court concluded that she
considered her teaching duties to include the conveying of the
Church’s message and the carrying out of its mission.46
Roberts then addressed the three errors that the Court of
Appeals committed when it concluded that Perich was not a
minister covered by the ministerial exception. The first was
the court’s failure to assign any relevance to the fact that she
was a commissioned minister.47 The second was the weight it
gave to the fact that lay teachers performed the same religious
duties as Perich.48 The final error was the court’s emphasis
how much of Perich’s teaching time was allocated to secular
duties as opposed to religious duties.49 On the later point,
Roberts disagreed with the EEOC’s suggestion that the
ministerial exception should only apply to employees who
perform exclusively religious functions. If that were the case,
the heads of religious congregations would not qualify as
ministers since their duties typically include a mix of religious
and secular functions including the raising of money, the
supervising of non-religious personnel, and the overseeing of
the maintenance of church property.50 In fact, the amount of
time that an employee devoted to religious functions might be
less relevant than the nature of those religious functions.51
In the original complaint, Perich had sought a variety of
remedies including reinstatement to her teaching job as well as
frontpay. Since Perich was covered by the ministerial
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exception, her request for reinstatement was inappropriate on
the grounds that to do so would violate Hosanna-Tabor’s First
Amendment right to select its own ministers.
The Court
similarly rejected her request for frontpay since it would also
“operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an
unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by the First
Amendment than an order overturning the terminations.”52
Roberts also addressed Perich’s claim that Hosanna-Tabor’s
alleged theological reason for discharging Perich was only a
pretext for getting rid of an employee with a disability. He
concluded that if an employee was covered by the ministerial
exception, that employee would not prevail even if he or she
could establish that the termination was for a non-theological
reason. In ministerial exception cases, that exception is the
affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim.53 The
reason for that is because “the exception instead ensures that
the authority to select and control who will minister to the
faithful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical”—is the church’s
alone.”54
The opinion ended with a brief reference to the “parade of
horribles” that Perich and the EEOC claimed would result if
the Court recognized the ministerial exception.55 While
Roberts did not offer the Court’s view with regard to the
appellants’ concerns, he did note those of Hosanna-Tabor.56
Finally, Roberts acknowledged that the only thing that had
been decided in the Hosanna-Tabor case was that the
ministerial exception barred employment discrimination
lawsuits.
The Court left until a future time the issue of
whether the ministerial exception could be applied to other
types of lawsuits including actions brought by employees
against their religious employer for breach of contract or
tortious conduct.57
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B. Concurring Opinions
Although Roberts’ opinion was joined by all nine members
of the Court, Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito
(joined by Elena Kagan) each submitted concurring opinions
that focused on the question that Roberts chose not to address.
That question was who actually qualifies to be a minister under
the ministerial exception.
Thomas’ three paragraph opinion suggested that if the
courts were going to uphold the Religion Clauses’ guarantee
that religious organizations were autonomous in matters of
internal governance (including their selection of ministers),
then the courts had to be willing to “defer to the religious
organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its
minister.”58 He was particularly concerned that any attempt to
establish a bright-line test or multi-factor analysis would
disadvantage religious groups whose beliefs, practices, and
membership were less traditional. 59
Alito’s concurring opinion, on the other hand, embraced the
idea of establishing some specific criteria for determining who
should be covered by the ministerial exception. He began by
rejecting the suggestion that the ministerial exception should
only apply to those employees who had been formally ordained
or been given the title of “minister.”60 One reason for his
conclusion was that most religious groups, other than
Protestants, do not refer to their clergy as ministers. Another
reason was that while the concept of ordination may be a
common practice in many Christian churches and in Judaism, it
is not so in all Christian denominations or in other religions.
That being the case, when a court applied the ministerial
exception, it needed to pay far more attention to the actual
functions that were performed by the people working for
religious organizations. Alito went on to identify three general
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categories of employees whose functions were essential to
practically all religious groups—“those who serve in positions
of leadership, those who perform important functions in
worship services and in the performance of religious
ceremonies and rituals, and those who are entrusted with
teaching and conveying the tenets of the faith to the next
generation.”61 The ministerial exception was applicable in
Hosanna-Tabor because of the substantial role Perich played in
“conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its
mission.”62 That she also taught secular subjects did not matter
since she “played an important role as an instrument of her
church’s religious message and as a leader of its worship
activities.”63 Alito concluded by rejecting the need to engage
in a pretext inquiry for cases where the ministerial exception
applied. Such an inquiry would force the court or jury to make
a judgment about church doctrine. The adjudication of
doctrinal questions would require the trier of fact to not only to
judge what a church really believed but also how important that
belief was the church’s mission. This would be result in an
unacceptable course of action that would “pose grave problems
for religious autonomy.”64
III.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Hosanna-Tabor was
unequivocal--ministerial employees are barred from suing their
religious employers based on alleged violations of
discrimination laws. The decision was, in fact, an affirmation
of a ministerial exception that had been applied by the Circuit
Courts for many years. In this case, the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment trumped the civil rights statutes.
Unfortunately, by not directly addressing the issue of who is
considered a minister for the purposes of the ministerial
exception, the Court left many religious organizations and their
employees scratching their heads. The deferential approach
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proposed by Thomas does not65 seem to be something that his
fellow justices felt comfortable endorsing. That would suggest
that attempts by religious organizations to characterize all of
their employees as ministers will not insulate them from
litigation arising out of claims of employment discrimination.
At the same time, the Court was equally reluctant to accept
Alito’s functional test for determining which employees were
covered by the ministerial exception.
The fact that the Supreme Court justices unanimously
agreed that the discrimination claim could not succeed in
Hosanna-Tabor was based on a particular set of facts. Perich
had not only applied for and received the title of “called
minister” but she had subsequently used that status to receive
government relief in the form of a tax benefit. What HosannaTabor did not address were those instances where the
employee had never affirmatively sought ministerial status.
Would the Court be so willing to accept the employer’s claim
for a ministerial exception when the employee in question had
neither sought ministerial status nor conceived of his or her job
in a catechetical context? One place where this issue might
arise would be in the area of higher education. What would
Hosanna-Tabor mean for a professor who teaches at a college
or university that follows a particular religious tradition, has a
mission statement that reflects particular religious values, and
also affirms the value of academic freedom? Would the
validity of that institution’s claim for a ministerial exception
with regard to a particular professor depend on that person’s
discipline?
Would the claim be treated differently if the
professor taught theology or religious studies—even though the
professor was considered a lay person within the canonical
structure of the institutional church? Would such a designation
be appropriate for a professor in other fields such as biology or
business law? Would it apply to a professor in any discipline
who participated in service-learning courses co-sponsored by
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the school’s campus ministry program? Or would the
employee be able to challenge the institution’s claim of a
ministerial exception on the grounds that calling the employee
a minister was merely a pretext for avoiding liability for illegal
discriminatory actions?
If the Chief Justice was looking for consensus is this case,
he was successful—but only to the limited extent that all of the
justices were willing to acknowledge a ministerial exception.
His inability to suggest future guidelines for who qualifies as a
minister may indeed be the consequence of a Court that was
“reluctant . . . to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an
employee qualifies as a minister.”66 On the other hand, it may
also be the result of a genuine disagreement among the justices
which will only be resolved as additional cases work their way
through the legal process.
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